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Abstract
A post-earnings announcement drift associated with the market reaction to analyst
forecasts errors remains a puzzle. This study suggests that whispers help to explain part
of the puzzle. The study examines the market reaction to whispers and analysts in bull
and bear markets, and finds that investors listen to whispers in the bull market and
whispers help explain the post-announcement drift. In a bear market, reaction to
whispers is significantly positive prior to announcement despite a down market,
indicating optimism by investors who follow whispers. However, in the bear market, both
whispers and analysts contribute to the post-announcement drift.

1. Introduction
Numerous studies document abnormal stock returns surrounding the earnings
announcements, but the explanation for the post earnings announcement drift remains a
puzzle.1 Brown (1997) concludes that the post-announcement drift exists separately from
the P/E effect, size effect, the Value Line effect, and that both the stock prices and
analysts underestimate the persistence of the earnings surprises. Studies by Bernard and
Thomas (1989) and Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) focus on the postearnings announcement drift and find evidence that unsophisticated (or noninstitutional)
investors account for the significant abnormal returns after the earnings release. Doukas,
Kim and Pantzalis (2002, 2004) argue that the abnormal returns of value stocks found
around the earnings announcement cannot be fully explained by analyst forecast errors.
They suggest that divergence of opinions among investors plays a role to explain
abnormal returns around earnings announcements. Our study adds to the literature by
suggesting that investors who follow whispers impact stock movement around the
earnings announcement. We suggest that the abnormal returns surrounding the earnings
announcement can be explained in part by the market response to whisper forecast errors.
Earlier studies by Bagnoli, Beneish, and Watts (1999) and Zaima and Harjoto (2005)
investigate anonymous individual forecasts or whispers surrounding the earnings release.
Bagnoli, et al. document that whispers add to the market expectation beyond the analysts
forecast. Zaima and Harjoto (2005) find that if a conflict arises between whisper and
analyst forecast errors, the market reaction to whispers dominate its response to analysts.
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Additionally, they create a portfolio that takes a short position when both forecast errors
are negative, long position when both forecast errors are positive, and use only whispers
when the two conflict, and find that the portfolio generates a post-announcement threeday abnormal return of approximately 6.5% to 8.2%.
These past studies of whispers and analyst forecasts have shown that the two convey
different information where one does not subsume the other. To examine the differences
of information contained in the two forecasts, we separate the market reaction to whisper
and analyst forecasts in the bull and bear markets because expectations might differ in
optimistic and pessimistic markets. Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by
attempting to explain the post-earnings drift. Hence, we examine two factors: (1) the
accuracy of analyst and whisper forecasts during the bull and bear markets and (2) the
market reaction to whisper and analyst forecast errors during the two markets over the
pre- and post-announcement periods.
The accuracy of whisper and analyst forecasts may differ because analysts generally
obtain information about firm earnings expectations from management while whispers
are individual investors’ expectations obtained from various sources including blogs and
Internet message boards. Since whispers rely on various sources of information while
analysts receive cues and information from the firms, we expect analyst forecasts to be
more accurate and whispers to be more divergent. Furthermore, we examine whether
individual investors are swayed by market momentum. In particular, we examine
whether whisper forecast errors are greater than analysts during bull markets and whether
whispers forecast errors, on average, are less than analysts during bear markets. In order
to test the accuracy of the forecasts, we compare the scaled forecast errors. We define
scaled forecast errors for analyst (SFE) and whisper (SWE) as:
SFE = (Actual EPS – Analyst forecast EPS)/|Actual EPS|
SWE = (Actual EPS – Whisper forecast EPS)/|Actual EPS|

(1)
(2)

Next we analyze the market reaction to individual investor expectations and determine
whether whisper forecast errors help to explain the post-announcement drift. We
examine the difference in the market reaction to whisper and analyst forecast errors in the
bull and bear markets before and after announcement. To test the market response to
forecast errors, we compare the market reaction during the pre- and post-announcement
period for the following scenarios:
1)
2)
3)
4)

SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bull market;
SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bull market;
SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bear market; and
SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bear market.

The four scenarios allow us to examine the different expectations conveyed by each
forecast during two different market conditions.
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2. Data and Methodology
2a. Data Collection and Sample
The actual earnings per share (EPS), the First Call analyst forecasts, and the whisper
forecasts are manually collected from a web site currently owned and operated by
WhisperNumber.com.2 A search engine and proprietary software are utilized to examine
thousands of messages per day on key Internet message boards that gather whisper
numbers on stocks. Additional whispers are obtained from web visitors who are
encouraged to enter their whispers for any stock. The staff examines the collected
whispers and discards the “absurd” outliers and obvious duplicates. The final whisper
number published on the web site is an equally scaled average of the whispers collected
for that stock. The Nasdaq high technology stocks appear to receive the greatest attention
as compared to other industries.3 A recent article in Barron’s states, “Contrary to what
has been reported, WhisperNumber.com doesn’t represent analysts”.4 The whispers
provided by this web site represent individual investors as opposed to analysts where
95% of its source is individual investors, and only 5% brokers.5
Our data collection from WhisperNumber.com spans the period from January 1999 to
April 2002. Firms are selected based on the news alert provided by the web site.
Additional firms are randomly selected from a Nasdaq listing in the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) tape. After selecting 140 firms for our firm sample, we collect
approximately 10 to 12 quarters of First Call analyst forecasts, actual EPS, and whispers
forecasts for 136 firms, resulting in a sample size of 1494 actual EPS and 1463 analyst
forecasts.6 Not all firms have whispers every quarter, therefore reducing our sample of
whisper numbers to 989. The number of observations for actual EPS, analysts EPS, and
whisper EPS reduces further due to missing values. Our final sample consists of 977
firms-quarters for SWE and 1448 firms-quarters for SFE.7
The stock returns are
extracted from the CRSP tape.
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Exhibit 1: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms
________________________________________________________________________
This exhibit presents the summary statistics for 136 firms during 1999-2002. All firms’
characteristics reported in this exhibit are stated in annually. Total assets, market value
of equity, net sales, and net income are stated in millions of dollars. Total shares
outstanding are stated in millions of shares. Sales growth and stock return are stated in
percent. ROA (return-on-assets) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. The
stock price is stated in dollars per share. The stock beta is calculated using the capital
asset pricing model of daily returns in one year. Leverage is calculated as total debt
divided by total assets.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Total assets ($ million)
38,989
6,965
98,916
Market value of equity ($ million)
44,713
15,092
74,983
Net sales ($ million)
16,450
5,380
27,781
Net income ($ million)
1,096
255
2,697
Total shares (million shares)
1,074
424
1,526
Sales growth (%)
38
13
134
Stock return (%)
21.32
12.82
103.23
ROA
0.03
0.05
0.52
Stock Price ($ per share)
40.51
33.2
43.73
Beta
1.38
1.26
0.78
Leverage
0.2
0.17
0.21
The descriptive statistics in Exhibit 1 provide a summary of financial data for 136 firms
obtained from COMPUSTAT. The mean for total assets is $38.989 billion (median is
$6.965 billion) and mean market value of equity is $44.713 billion (median is $15.092
billion). The sample mean reflects large firms (such as IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and
Cisco), but the lower median implies that most of the firms in the sample are smaller
firms. Similar results are found for net sales where its mean is $16.450 billion while its
median is $5.380 billion as well as for net income; its mean is $1.096 billion and the
median is only $255 million. The mean number of shares outstanding equals 1.074
billion while the median equals 424 million shares. Again these statistics attest to the
higher frequency of smaller firms.
Firm performance measures also indicate a skewness in the sample. The mean annual
stock return is 21.32% while the median is 12.82%. Sales growth is much larger for the
mean (38%) compared to the median of 13%. The mean return on assets equals 3% while
its median is only 5%. Also the mean stock price is higher ($40.51) than the median
($33.20). However, the mean and median betas and leverage ratios are closer. The mean
beta is 1.38 and median is 1.26 whereas the mean leverage ratio is 20% while its median
is 17%.
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Exhibit 2: Actual Earnings, Forecasts and Forecast Errors During Bull Market
________________________________________________________________________
This exhibit presents the distribution, mean and standard deviation of actual earnings per
share (EPS), analyst and whispers forecasts, and forecasts errors from the analysts and
the whispers during bull stock market (January 1999 through March 2000) and bear
stock market (April 2000 through April 2002). The earnings per share are stated in
dollars per share. The SFE is the scaled analyst forecast error defined as (actual EPS Analyst forecast)/(absolute value of actual EPS). The SWE is the scaled whisper forecast
error defined as (actual EPS - Whisper forecast)/(absolute value of actual EPS).
Panel A. Bull Market
Panel B. Bear Market
Percentiles
SFE
SWE
SFE
SWE
1%
-1.08
-3.00
-1.09
-2.00
5%
-0.19
-0.59
-0.19
-0.70
10%
-0.03
-0.25
-0.06
-0.40
25%
0
-0.09
0
-0.09
50%
0.04
0
0.03
0
75%
0.11
0.06
0.11
0.09
90%
0.25
0.22
0.33
0.25
95%
0.38
0.45
0.53
0.45
99%
2.00
0.86
2.00
2.00
Mean
0.08
-0.13
0.10
-0.02
Std. Dev.
1.02
1.24
0.96
1.03
Observations (N)
591
317
857
660
H0: SFE = SWE
Wilcoxon
Sign-Rank Test:
H1: SFE ≠ SWE
Z-test
5.606
Z-test
6.538
P-value
0.0001
P-value
0.0001
The summary statistics in Exhibit 2, Panel A, allow us to examine the accuracy of
whisper and analyst forecast errors in the bull market. During the boom, the analyst
forecast errors are very conservative with their median equaled to +0.04 and 75% of the
forecast errors are positive, indicating that forecasts were less than or equaled to the
actual earnings. The mean of the analyst forecast errors equals +0.08, again supporting
the conservatism displayed by analysts. In contrast, the whisper forecast errors during
the bull market exhibits optimism with a mean forecast error of –0.13, indicating
whispers, on average, were greater than actual earnings. However, the median of whisper
forecast errors is zero showing that individual investors are relatively unbiased.8
Together, the two results show that individual investors are generally optimistic, but not
entirely swayed by market momentum. Exhibit 2, Panel A, also displays the results of
the Wilcoxon sign rank statistics testing the null hypothesis that the difference between
SFE and SWE equals zero. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level

8
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reflection of individual investor expectations.
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with z-statistics equaled to 5.61. This result infers that the analyst and whisper forecast
errors are statistically different during the boom.
Exhibit 2, Panel B, presents the forecast errors during the bear market. During the bust,
we find that analyst forecast errors are similar to the ones during the boom. That is, the
median is +0.03 and 75% of the forecast errors are positive, again indicating analyst
conservatism in estimating earnings. Furthermore, the mean of the analyst forecast errors
is +0.10 providing additional support for analyst conservatism. There is also additional
evidence of optimism by investors who forecast whispers. Our analysis rejects the
conjecture that individual investors are swayed by the downward market momentum as
whispers do not reflect the pessimism of the market. The mean of SWE equals –0.02
indicating individual investor forecasts, on average, were higher than actual earnings.
Although whispers remain optimistic, investors adjust to the general market conditions,
as mean SWE is much lower during the bust period than the boom (-0.02 versus -0.13).
So individual investors recognize the change in market conditions and adjust their
expectations downward. Similar to the boom period, the median for the whisper forecast
error equals zero indicating an unbiased estimate of firms’ earnings. The Wilcoxon sign
rank statistics testing the null hypothesis that the difference between SFE and SWE
equals zero is rejected. It provides supporting evidence that the difference between
analyst and whisper forecast errors is statistically different during the bust with a zstatistic equaled to 6.54.
In summary, the forecast errors imply that individual investors are more optimistic than
analysts regardless of the market. Although whispers remain relatively optimistic during
the bust, the whisper forecast errors are adjusted downward. In contrast, the analyst
forecasts appear to be unaffected by the general market conditions based on the fact that
75% of the time their forecasts fall below actual earnings. During the boom the standard
deviation for whispers and analysts are 1.24 and 1.02, respectively, and during the bust it
is 1.03 and 0.96 respectively. The range of SFE during the boom is –1.08 to +2.00 while
the range for SWE is –3.00 to +0.86. During the bust, the range for SFE is –1.09 to
+2.00 and for SWE, it is –2.00 to +2.00. These results support the conjecture that
whispers exhibit higher variability reflecting a wider range of market expectations.
The histogram in Exhibit 3A presents the distribution of scaled forecast errors for
analysts (SFE) and whispers (SWE) during the boom. The distribution of SWEs is
generally more dispersed than the SFEs. The analyst forecast errors are somewhat
positively skewed, again, exhibiting analyst conservatism. In contrast, SWEs are
generally more negative during the boom displaying their optimism. The histogram of
the bear market shown in Exhibit 3B, depicts SFE to be slightly more positive, again,
indicating analysts’ conservatism During the bust, the whisper forecast errors adjust
down with the highest frequency at +0.05 although there are numerous occurrences of
negative SWEs. These results indicate that whispers adjust their earning expectations
based on the general market conditions while analysts are consistently conservative.
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Exhibit 3A: The Distribution of the Scaled Analyst and Whisper Forecast Errors
During Bull Market
This exhibit shows the frequency distribution of the scaled analyst forecast errors (SFE)
and the scaled whisper forecast errors (SWE) across 136 firms during five quarters of
January 1999-March 2000 (Bull market). The vertical axis represents the percentage of
frequencies (%) and the horizontal axis represents the scaled forecast errors.
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Exhibit 3B: The Distribution of the Scaled Analyst and Whisper Forecast Errors
during Bear Market
This exhibit shows the frequency distribution of the scaled analyst forecast errors (SFE)
and the scaled whisper forecast errors (SWE) across 136 firms during eight quarters of
April 2000-April 2002 (Bear market). The vertical axis represents the percentage of
frequencies (%) and the horizontal axis represents the scaled forecast errors.
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2b. Event Study Methodology
We use standard event study methodology to test the market reactions to analyst and
whisper forecast errors. The market adjusted abnormal return is calculated by subtracting
the value-weighted CRSP portfolio return from the actual stock return. Average abnormal
returns (AARs) are obtained by taking a cross-sectional average of abnormal returns for
all firms in the sample for each relative event date. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
are obtained by summing the AARs over the relative dates, -3 to -1, -2 to -1, -1 to 0, 0 to
+1, +1 to +1, and +1 to +3, where –3 is defined as three days prior to the earnings
announcement, 0 is defined as the announcement date, and +3 is defined as three days
after the announcement date. We define –3 to –1 and –2 to -1 as the pre-announcement
periods, and +1 to +2 and +1 to +3 as the post-announcement periods. Day –1 to 0 is
defined as the announcement period.
Regression analysis is also utilized to test the role of both forecasts and to examine
whether there is a structural change in the market’s response to whispers and to analysts
during the bull and bear markets. A dummy variable is utilized with January 1999 to
March 2000 defined as the bull market and April 2000 to April 2002 defined as the bear
market. Regression analysis is conducted over the pre-announcement and postannouncement periods. The regression equation incorporates a dummy variable to
represent the bull and bear markets and interaction terms.
CARj(T1,T2) = α0 + α1SFE + α2SWE + α3BULL + α4BULLSFE + α5BULLSWE + ej

(3)

where: T1=-2 and T2=-1 for the pre-announcement period and
T1=+1 and T2=+2 for the post-announcement period
BULL =
1 if announcement occurred on or before March 2000
0 otherwise;
BULLSFE = SFE if announcement occurred on or before March 2000
0 otherwise;
BULLSWE = SWE if announcement occurred on or before March 2000
0 otherwise
If the slope of SFE (SWE) is significant, we can conclude that analyst (whisper) forecast
errors contribute to the CARs around the earnings announcements. If the slope
coefficient of BULL is statistically significant, we can deduce that there is a structural
change in the market response to earnings announcements. If the coefficient for the
interaction term BULLSFE is significant, then the correlation between the CAR and SFE
changes when the market changes from bull to bear, and if BULLSWE is significant,
then the correlation between CAR and SWE changes when the market fluctuates from
bull to bear.
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3. Empirical Results
3a. Market Reactions to Actual Earnings Announcements
First, our samples of analyst forecasts and whispers are split into positive and negative
forecast errors. Next we divide the four subsamples into two markets, bull and bear,
resulting in a total of eight subsamples. Finally, we categorize the eight subsamples into
four scenarios to make a direct comparison between whisper and analyst forecast errors
under each market condition.
Scenario 1: SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bull market;
Scenario 2: SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bull market;
Scenario 3: SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bear market; and
Scenario 4: SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bear market.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in Exhibit 4, Panel A, provides results for
Scenario 1. The market reactions to both analyst and whisper forecast errors are similar
in timing, but different in magnitude. When actual EPS meets/beats analyst expectations
(SFE ≥0) the CARs are statistically significant and positive over the pre- and postannouncement periods. The CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.39% (4.36) and CAR(-2,-1) is 1.09%
(4.20) over the pre-announcement period and CAR(-1,0) equals 0.99% (3.81) for the
announcement date with t-statistics in parenthesis. The CARs are significant for only two
days after announcement where CAR(0,+1) is 0.64% (2.47) and CAR(+1,+2) equals
0.51% (1.96). Similarly, when actual EPS meets/beats the whispers (SWE ≥0) the CARs
are statistically significant and positive over the pre- and post-announcement periods.
Market reaction to whispers exhibits CARs of 1.10% (2.13) for CAR(-3,-1) and 0.87%
(2.07) for CAR(-2,-1). The CAR(-1,0), which is the announcement date, is statistically
significant and equals 1.84% (4.35). During the post-announcement period, the market
reaction to whispers exhibit significant CARs over two days, with CAR(0,+1) equaled to
1.37% (3.24) and CAR(+1,+2) equaled to 1.19% (2.81). These results suggest that the
timing of the market reaction to the whispers forecast error is the same as the analysts.
However, the magnitude of CARs is different. In the bull market, the market response to
analyst is stronger over the pre-announcement period where CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.39% for
analysts compared to 1.10% for whispers. Conversely, its reaction to whispers is stronger
over the post-announcement period where CAR(+1,+2) is 0.51% for analysts and 1.19%
for whispers. Moreover it provides support that investor reaction to whispers contributes
to the post-announcement drift.
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Exhibit 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns during Bull and Bear Markets
This exhibit presents univariate tests of market adjusted cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) between analysts forecast and ahispers. The POSITIVE SFE indicates actual EPS
meet/beat the analysts forecast and the POSITIVE SWE denotes actual EPS meet/beat the
whispers. The NEGATIVE SFE represents actual EPS do not meet the analysts forecast
and the NEGATIVE SWE indicates actual EPS do not meet the whispers. Scenario (1)
represents the actual earnings meet/beat the whisper or analyst forecasts during the bull
market. Scenario (2) signifies the actual earnings do not meet the whisper or analyst
forecasts during the bull market. Scenario (3) implies the actual earnings meet/beat the
whisper or analyst forecasts during the bear market. Scenario (4) indicates the actual
earnings do not meet the whisper or analyst forecasts during the bear market. The t-ratio
is presented in the parenthesis. The *, ** and *** indicate the significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
Panel A. Bull Market
SCENARIO (1)
POSITIVE
POSITIVE
SFE
SWE
(-3,-1)
1.39%
1.10%
(4.36)***
(2.13)**
(-2,-1)
1.09%
0.87%
(4.20)***
(2.07)**
(-1,0)
0.99%
1.84%
(3.81)***
(4.35)***
(0,+1)
0.64%
1.37%
(2.47)**
(3.24)***
(+1,+2)
0.51%
1.19%
(1.96)**
(2.81)***
(+1,+3)
-0.01%
0.54%
(-0.05)
(1.05)

SCENARIO (2)
NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE
SFE
SWE
0.72%
1.19%
(0.98)
(2.12)*
0.49%
0.72%
(0.81)
(1.59)
0.84%
0.80%
(1.40)
(1.76)*
-0.42%
-0.02%
(-0.71)
(-0.05)
-0.82%
-1.97%
(-1.37)
(-4.31)***
-0.93%
-2.89%
(-1.26)
(-5.14)***

Panel B. Bear Market
SCENARIO (3)
POSITIVE
POSITIVE
SFE
SWE
(-3,-1)
0.85%
0.99%
(2.86)***
(2.38)**
(-2,-1)
0.53%
0.80%
(2.20)**
(2.35)**
(-1,0)
-0.03%
0.38%
(-0.16)
(1.13)
(0,+1)
0.00%
0.50%
(0.00)
(1.49)
(+1,+2)
0.14%
0.54%
(0.59)
(1.58)
(+1,+3)
0.61%
0.92%
(2.05)**
(2.19)**

SCENARIO (4)
NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE
SFE
SWE
0.76%
1.39%
(1.07)
(2.80)***
0.51%
0.86%
(0.89)
(2.12)**
-0.33%
-0.01%
(-0.57)
(-0.05)
-2.15%
-1.63%
(-3.69)***
(-4.02)***
-2.66%
-2.30%
(-4.56)***
(-5.67)***
-3.08%
-1.97%
(-4.32)***
(-3.96)***
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Scenario 2 examines the negative forecast errors during the bull market. When actual
EPS misses the analyst forecasts, the pre- and post-announcement CARs are not
statistically significant where CAR(-3,-1) is 0.72% (0.98) and CAR(+1,+2) equals –
0.82% (-1.37) with t-statistics in parenthesis. However, when actual EPS falls short of
whispers the results are noticeably different. The pre-announcement CARs are
significant and positive as investors expect good news in a bull market. The preannouncement CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.19% (2.12). The CARs over other subperiods do not
exhibit statistical significance where CAR(-2,-1) is 0.72% (1.59) and CAR(-1,0) equals
0.80% (1.76). However, after the bad news is released, the post-announcement CARs are
significantly negative and equal –1.97% (- 4.31) for CAR(+1,+2) and –2.89% (-5.14) for
CAR(+1,+3). The results suggest that investors following whispers are more optimistic
during the bull market indicated by statistically significant positive pre-announcement
returns. The CAR(-3,-1) for whispers equals 1.19% compared to 0.72% for analysts.
Additionally, whispers react more negatively after the bad news is released with
CAR(+1,+3) equaled to –2.89% which is statistically significant while the postannouncement CAR for analyst is –0.93% and not statistically significant. Although it
could reflect market correction for the unwarranted positive returns before
announcement, the market reaction to whispers (not analysts) accounts for the postannouncement drift. By and large, the market appears to ignore the negative analyst
forecast errors during the bull market.
The strong whisper effect during the post-announcement period is consistent with results
found by Bartov et al., Brown, and Doukas, et al. Bartov et al. conjecture that “the
trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns
after earnings announcements” (Bartov et al., 2000, p. 43). They define unsophisticated
investors as noninstitutional investors, which is consistent with the group who utilize
whispers.9 Therefore, investors using whispers explain, in part, the post earnings
announcement drift.
Exhibit 4, Panel B, reports the results of Scenario 3 where we examine positive forecast
errors during the bear market. The results show that the timing of the market reaction to
both analyst and whisper forecast errors are similar although the size of CARs is slightly
larger for whispers. When actual EPS meets/beats analyst forecasts the CARs exhibit
significant positive returns before and after the announcement period. The subperiod
CARs for analysts equal 0.85% (2.86) over CAR(-3,-1) and 0.61% (2.05) over
CAR(+1,+3) with t-statistics in parenthesis. When actual EPS meets/beats whispers,
CARs also exhibit positive significant returns before and after the announcement date.
The cumulative abnormal return for the pre-announcement period, CAR(-3,-1), is 0.99%
(2.38) and the post-announcement period, CAR(+1,+3), equals 0.92% (2.19). The CARs
are slightly larger for whispers than analysts over pre- and post-announcement periods.
However, both forecast errors contribute to the post-announcement drift.
In Scenario 4, where forecast errors are negative and the market is in a slump, we find the
market reaction during the post-announcement period for analysts and whispers is similar
9

Forsyth (2003), in Barron’s, states that 95 percent of whispers represent individual investors as opposed to
analysts.
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in timing, but different in magnitude. When actual EPS are less than the analyst
forecasts, the CAR results in Exhibit 4, Panel B, report significant negative CARs during
the post-announcement period (CAR(+1,+2) equals –2.66% (-4.56) and CAR(+1,+3) is –
3.08% (-4.32)). However, the market reaction to whispers during the pre-announcement
indicate that it anticipates positive news even in a bear market and exhibits positive and
significant subperiod CARs. CAR(-3,-1), equals 1.39% (2.80), and CAR(-2,-1) is 0.86%
(2.12). As soon as the bad news is released, the market reacts negatively with significant
CAR(0,+1) equal to –1.63% (-4.02). Also post-announcement CARs equal –2.30% (5.67) for CAR(+1,+2), and –1.97% (-3.96) for CAR(+1,+3) with t-statistics in
parenthesis. It provides evidence that the investors following whispers are generally
more optimistic than ones following the analysts indicated by the smaller negative CARS
(-1.97% versus –3.08%). However, in the bear market, both forecasts contribute to the
post-announcement drift.
Our final analysis examines the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and
the analyst and whisper forecast errors as well as a dummy variable to represent the bull
and bear markets.
3b. Regression Analysis
Exhibit 5 shows that SWE is statistically significantly correlated to the pre- and postannouncement periods while SFE is not. It implies that SWE is more strongly correlated
to the market response surrounding the earnings releases than SFE. Moreover when
forecast errors are positive (Scenarios 1 and 3), results show that the interaction term,
BULLSWE, is marginally significant (1.93) in the post-announcement period. When
forecast errors are negative (Scenarios 2 and 4), results show that the interaction term,
BULLSWE, is statistically significant over the pre- and post-announcement periods, but
BULLSFE is not. It provides evidence that whispers contribute to the pre- and postannouncement drift and the relationship between CAR and whispers changes when the
market changes from bull to bear.
In summary, the regression findings indicate that not only are whispers correlated to
CARs in the pre- and post-announcement periods, but the relationship between CARs and
whispers is significantly stronger during the bull, compared to the bear. The results
suggest that whispers add to the analyst forecasts to explain the pre- and postannouncement drifts during the bull market.
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Exhibit 5: Regression Analysis Results
This exhibit presents the regression analyses of two days market adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) prior and after the actual EPS announcements. The columns
utilize regression model:
CAR(T1,T2)i,t = γ0 + η1SFEi,t + η2SWEi,t + η3BULLSFEi,t + η4BULLSWEi,t + η3BULLi,t +
υi,t.
The dependent variables are CAR(-2,-1) and CAR(+1,+2) as defined above. The
independent variables are SFE, SWE, a dummy variable, BULL, and two interaction
terms, BULLSFE and BULLSWE. BULL is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if
the period is during the Bull stock market of January 1999 through March 2000, and zero
otherwise. BULLSFE is an interaction term between BULL and the SFE variable.
BULLSWE is an interaction term between BULL and the SWE variable. Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. We also examine the Scholes-Williams excess return using
the value-weighted portfolio (Scholes and Williams, 1977) and the results are similar to
the results presented below. The *, ** and *** indicate the significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively.

SFE
SWE
BULLSFE
BULLSWE
BULL
Intercept
R-squared
F-ratio
p-value
Observations

SCENARIO (1) and (3)
CAR(-2,-1)
CAR(+1,+2)
0.0040
-0.0077
(1.01)
(1.07)
0.0099
0.0135
(3.80)***
(2.54)**
-0.0011
0.0032
(0.21)
(0.41)
0.0104
0.0167
(1.62)
(1.93)*
0.0016
-0.0013
(0.38)
(0.19)
0.0045
-0.0022
(1.75)*
(0.51)
0.03
0.01
3.87
1.66
(0.0018)***
( 0.1407)
860
860

SCENARIO (2) and (4)
CAR(-2,-1)
CAR(+1,+2)
-0.0025
0.0036
(0.67)
(0.86)
0.0102
0.0161
(3.68)***
(2.51)**
0.0097
0.0133
(1.43)
(1.72)
0.0113
0.0213
(2.09)**
(2.56)**
-0.0040
-0.0071
(0.72)
(0.75)
0.0087
-0.0139
(2.31)**
(2.38)**
0.02
0.02
10.1
37.24
(0.0000)***
(0.0000)***
466
466

4. Conclusions
Do bulls and bears listen to whispers or analysts? The whisper forecast errors are more
optimistic than analysts in both bull and bear markets. Furthermore the market reacts
more optimistically to whispers than to analysts during the pre-announcement period,
regardless of the market conditions.
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During the boom, the market reacts more significantly to positive analyst forecast errors
in the pre-announcement period while it reacts more significantly to whispers during the
post-announcement period. Moreover, the significant negative CARs for whispers
indicate that bulls respond to negative whisper forecast errors (SWEs), but they appear to
ignore the negative analyst forecast errors.
These results imply that negative SWEs
significantly contribute to the post-announcement drift.
In a bear market, both positive whisper and analyst forecast errors produce significant
positive CARs before and after announcements. When both forecast errors are negative,
bears react significantly only after the earnings release. However, bears that listen to
whispers appear to be optimistic even in a down market as CARs are marginally
significant and positive before the bad news is released. However, when it is released,
the market reaction to both whispers and analyst is significantly negative during the postannouncement period. Therefore, the bears listen to analysts and whispers and both
affect the post-announcement drift.
In summary, the market reaction to whispers is stronger than to analysts in a bull market,
implying that investors listen more to whispers during the boom. However, in the bear
market there is no distinct difference between the market reactions to analyst forecasts
and whispers. The results suggest that individual investors respond more exuberantly to
whispers during a market boom, but lose interest when the market is down. Finally, the
market response to whispers, in particular, is the main source of market movements
during the post-announcement period providing evidence that whispers help to explain
the post-announcement drift in the bull market.
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